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 ǯ The Heart of Human Rights1 provides a thoughtful and field-
opening analysis of the legal nature of human rights. The work proposes that there 
is an important difference between the morality of human rights and the legality of 
the practice of international human rights. On the one hand of the literature, 
philosophers have attempted to justify the morality of human rights, which 
Buchanan guides us through with precision and care. On the other hand, Buchanan 
proposes to expand the almost-    Ǯ ǯ of legal 
human rights Ǥǯ
twofold in this respect: first, the existing literature has not actually provided a 
philosophical justification for whether the system of human rights is justifiable; and 
second, philosophers of all the various schools of thought on the topic have been 
conceptual imperialists Ȃ assuming that only their conception of human rights is the 
correct one. Let us take these two contributions in turn.  
 
In first instance, Joseph ǯǮǯfield, by claiming 
that international human rights must correspond, or mirror, pre-existing moral 
rights2. The focus of philosophers has been on the moral rights themselves, which 
can then be transcribed into international human rights by lawyers. Buchanan 
convincingly argues that such a view is untenable. The ǮPracticeǯ of these human 
rights itself cannot be safely ignored by philosophers, as there is a discrepancy 
between individual human rights and the collective application of these rights in the 
practice. Taking the concrete examples of rights to education and healthcare, 
Buchanan claims that the duties placed upon states to provide these services to their 
citizens are better thought of in terms of a system of legal obligations, rather than as 
moral duties. The question of the legitimacy of the system, thus, becomes all-the-
more important.  
 
In the second instance, the two major opposing schools of thought on the nature of 
human rights, the Political and Practical theorists on the one hand, and the Orthodox 
or Moral theorists on the other, have each tried to impose their conception of human 
rights in an imperialist manner. The former have done so by claiming that human 
rights act as restraints on state sovereignty, while the latter have argued for the 
rights of human beings by virtue of their humanity. Instead of arguing for one or the 
other of these views, Buchanan purports that we still lack a justification of the 
system of human rights, as it actually exists in practice. This justification is provided 
by Buchanan in this book, with a focus on one aspect of the Practice, namely the UN-
based system of human rights law. But Buchanan also identifies other areas of 
research for this field which would further contribute to the same research agenda: 
international and regional courts of human rights, NGOs, civil society groups, 
whistle-blowing officials, domestic courts, legislatures, etc. Students of human rights 
practice would be wise to follow his footsteps.  
 
                                                        
1 Buchanan, Allen. 2013. The Heart of Human Rights. New York, Oxford University Press. 
2 ǡǤ ? ? ? ?Ǥǲ	ǳ Besson, Samantha and Tasioulas, John, 
eds. The Philosphy of International Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
There are, however, several limitations to the arguments put forward by Buchanan. 
Let me begin with his method. Buchanan proposes a pluralistic justificatory method Ǥǯroring view, and a direct criticism of 
the link between moral human rights and legal human rights. Simply put, Buchanan 
denies that pre-existing moral human rights are either necessary or sufficient for 
justifying legal human rights. This view, however, itself mirrors the view put 
forward by Rawls in a Theory of Justice3. There, Rawls had argued that moral 
agreement on a common conception of the good was not necessary to determine the 
justice of public institutions. Buchanan applies this insight to a different setting, and 
claims that moral agreement about the status of human rights is not needed for a 
justification of these legal rights in international institutions. Both Rawls and 
Buchanan refer to this method as one of pluralism, i.e. of finding agreement on the 
running of public institutions despite disagreement about conceptions of the good; 
yet both are ultimately weak pluralists, as they seek agreement on the conception of 
justice. This method has its appeal, of course, but it also has its drawbacks, and ǯ      criticism leveled against Rawls. Let us ǣǯ      Ǯ ǯ Ȃ a world where the rightness of a      ǯ      
procedures4Ǥ      ǯ     
other than procedural in this sense. This sterilized approach to human rights does 
little to address the concerns, raised by Buchanan himself on the very first page of 
his book, that human rights generally face. What of those who object that human 
rights lack moral foundations, or that they serve the interest of powerful states, or 
that they lack legitimacy because they are the product of undemocratic institutions? 
Treating human rights procedurally further exacerbates those concerns, and it is 
unclear how this procedural approach constitutes the heart of human rights Ȃ rather 
than its cold, rational, and bureaucratic side.  
 
Much more powerful, however, is the conclusion by Buchanan that some legal rights 
provide certain benefits Ȃ education and healthcare, for example Ȃ that are stronger 
than any moral human right could justify. This is potentially quite a radical 
contribution, but Buchanan shies away from these consequences by failing to call 
upon the United States to provide these goods for its citizens, for example. In the 
end, it is difficult not to throw back the accusation of imperialism at the author. For 
Buchanan remains noncommittal about the voluntary nature of legal human rights. 
While in the past, states have signed treaties on a voluntary basis, he argues that it is 
not a necessary model for the future, and that it is not morally unacceptable to 
impose certain human rights. This would raise alarm bells in many corners of the ǡǯ
works.  
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Last but not least, Buchanan fails to take seriously enough the pluralist challenge, 
which he nevertheless devotes a chapter to. Like Rawls, his pluralism is not radical, 
but superficial. Unlike someone like John Gray, for example, who has argued for the 
merits of a modus vivendi5, Buchanan incorrectly assumes that this model is weak 
because it is based on a balance of power, where no-one can enforce their own 
interests on others. A much thicker understanding of pluralism, whereby lack of 
agreement between different moral values is not taken as a nuisance but as a 
richness and a positive element in itself, is altogether ignored. Buchanan still tries to 
find a way in which legal human rights can be imposed on all, without considering 
that there are a number of approaches that could bypass these universal rights, 
which so often end up justifying the interests of the powerful.  
                                                        
5 Gray, John. 2000. Two Faces of Liberalism. Cambridge, Polity Press.  
